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Abstract 
 
 
 
Mass privatization offers a particularly suitable framework to study the change in ownership 
concentration as the extent of change is unusual for a stable market economy.  Focusing on two 
different mass privatization schemes in two transition economies, Poland and the Czech 
Republic, we find that despite important differences in the design of the two programmes and 
despite different quality of legal and regulatory framework, ownership structure in the two 
countries has rapidly evolved and the emerging ownership patterns are remarkably similar. This 
suggests that private benefits of control are large and the quality of investor protection regime is 
low in both countries. However, looking at the relationship between the change in ownership 
concentration and firm performance, we find an interesting difference between the two countries: 
in the Czech Republic the increase in ownership concentration seems to be less likely in poorly 
performing firms while in Poland the quality of past performance does not affect investors' 
willingness to increase their holdings. This effect may be interpreted in the light of the theory 
stressing the importance of the quality of investors' protection. It could be argued that if Czech 
investors are more risk averse and more concerned with diversification this is largely due to the 
weakness of the legal protection they face.   
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1. Introduction
1 
 
Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe strongly relied on ‘wholesale’ methods to transfer 
assets from the state to the private sector. These strategies, often qualified as 'mass privatization', 
consisted of a free transfer of equity of a large number of firms to large segments of the 
population. Since the beginning of transition, mass privatization has been strongly criticised as 
being 'artificial' and unable to provide firms with 'real owners' or to improve firm performance. 
One of the main criticisms concerned the dispersed ownership structure that mass privatisation 
was expected to generate. Some countries, e.g. Poland, sensitive to this argument, chose to 
impose a concentrated ownership structure on privatized firms. The main concern was avoiding 
excessive dispersion of ownership and providing companies with ‘effective owners’, capable and 
willing to enforce control over management and undertake profound firm restructuring. In other 
countries, such as the Czech Republic, where privatization was understood as the key element of 
the process of radical institutional change and was expected to create important synergies, the 
main concern was the speed of the process and less attention was paid to the emergence of a 
specific ownership structure.  
 
Several years after the initial distribution of firms' equity, it is still largely believed that mass 
privatization schemes were plagued with inefficiencies mostly due to rigid and/or inefficient 
ownership structure. However, if we look at the actual change at firm level it turns out that the 
effective reallocation of property rights has been quite extensive and that the ownership 
concentration has significantly increased.
2 Therefore, it becomes interesting to describe this 
evolution in detail and to explore if and how ownership structure adjusted to firm specific 
characteristics and to factors characterizing the firm's environment.  
 
It should be stressed that the objective of this paper is quite modest. We do not try to assess 
whether and how ownership structure affects performance. Neither have we distinguished the 
                                                 
1  We are grateful to Jean-Francois Nivet for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper and to 
Erjon Luci and Bartlomiej Paczoski for invaluable help with the data.  
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managerial ownership dimension of ownership structure. These are important questions that have 
been studied by a number of authors and also need to be investigated further.
3 In focusing on the 
determinants of ownership concentration we follow the literature initiated by Demsetz (1983) 
and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who argued that ownership structure should be viewed as the 
result of shareholders’ optimizing decisions.
4 Considering the determinants of ownership 
concentration may be viewed as a first step. The next and an important extension of this paper 
would be to consider the relationship between ownership and firm performance in a 
simultaneous equation framework: in such framework with firm performance and ownership 
concentration being the two dependent variables, we could consider potential causality running 
form ownership to performance. 
 
We focus on firms privatized through two different mass privatization schemes in two transition 
economies, Poland and the Czech Republic. Mass privatization offers a particularly suitable 
framework to study the change in ownership concentration as the extent of change is unusual for 
a stable market economy. We find that despite important differences in the design of the two 
programmes and despite different quality of legal and regulatory framework, ownership structure 
in the two countries has rapidly evolved and the emerging ownership patterns are remarkably 
similar. Ownership concentration has significantly increased and we can observe an important 
reallocation of ownership claims between different groups of shareholders. In the Czech 
Republic, starting from a highly dispersed ownership structure, in almost half of companies a 
majority of shares is held by a single block holder. Similarly in Poland, starting from a particular 
ownership structure imposed by the National Investment Funds (NIF) programme, the majority 
of companies involved in the scheme have been freed of NIFs’ control and almost half of them 
have found a single block holding entity with a majority of shares. Ownership concentration, 
                                                                                                                                                             
2 Berglöf and Pajuste (2003) document high ownership concentration in a number of transition 
economies. 
3 For important theoretical contributions see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
Bolton and von Tadden (1998), Burkart et al. (1997). Some of recent empirical papers include McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg, et al. (1999), Miguel, et al. (2001).  Works on transition economies 
include Claessens and Djankov (1999), Kocenda and Svejnar (2003), and Simoneti, et al. (2003).  
4 For recent contributions, see Bebchuk (1999), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Lamba and Stapledon 
(2002). Jones and Mygind (1999) and Jones, et al. (2003) deal with the determinants of ownership 
structure in a transition economy.   
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defined as the presence of a majority shareholder or the increase in the share of the largest 
owner, seems to be mainly determined by firms’ past performance and by the identity of the 
largest owner.  
 
The difference between the two countries appears when we consider how past performance 
affects the increase in ownership concentration: it turns out that the impact of past performance 
is positive in the Czech Republic and insignificant or even negative in Poland. This suggests that 
in Poland shareholders believe they can obtain some benefits of control and do not fear 
increasing their holdings in less profitable firms while in the Czech Republic less profitable firms 
are considered as too risky and shareholders prefer increasing their equity holdings in better 
performing firms. Such result may be interpreted in the light of "law matters" theory due to La 
Porta, et al. (1998).
5 The difference in the shareholders' attitude towards risk in the two countries 
may indeed be due to the differences in the quality of the legal framework. Poland is usually 
praised for high standards of its regulation while the Czech Republic, especially in the early and 
mid-1990s, has been blamed for its weaknesses (see Glaeser, et al., 2001) 
 
The evidence of a dynamic adjustment of the ownership structure provided in this paper suggests 
that, contrary to the concern of the critics of mass privatisation programmes, they were not the 
most inefficient way of transferring assets from the state to the public sector. The initial 
ownership structure they created was transitory and rapidly gave way to new configurations. This 
evidence may help to explain the apparently surprising result of Bennett, et al. (2004). Analyzing 
the impact of various privatization methods on economic growth in a cross-country setting, they 
find that mass privatization was the only method with a significantly positive effect. Although 
we do not consider here the relationship between privatization and performance, the fact that 
ownership structure in our firms has become highly concentrated may provide an element of 
explanation. 
 
                                                 
5 Looking at cross-country variations, La Porta, et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership 
(measured by the stake of the three largest shareholders) is negatively correlated with the quality of 
investors’ legal protection. In other words ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal 
protection of investors.    
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the two mass privatization schemes in 
Poland and in the Czech Republic and show how ownership concentration and the type of the 
controlling shareholders have changed since the beginning of the process. In section 3 we 
consider the potential determinants of ownership concentration. Empirical model is presented in 
section 4, the results in section 5 and we conclude in section 6. 
 
2. Mass Privatisation and after: reallocation of equity stakes in the Czech 
Republic and Poland. 
 
 
Despite broad similarity of their reform programme, Poland and the Czech Republic embarked 
on two different variants of mass privatisation (briefly described in Appendix 1). Various 
political and social considerations played a role. Most importantly, the choice was determined by 
the policy makers’ understanding of the role of privatisation in market processes. In Poland 
privatisation was seen as a means of improving firm incentives and its real objective was firm 
restructuring. More orthodox methods of privatisation (IPOs, negotiated sales, auctions, etc.) 
were seen as more efficient from that point of view, but it soon became clear that privatisation 
would be too slow if it were to rely exclusively on such methods. Therefore, the National 
Investment Funds (NIF) programme was initiated to supplement other methods and speed up the 
process. The design of this programme was dominated by the concern about corporate 
governance arrangements favouring enterprise restructuring. In particular, a concentrated 
ownership structure was imposed on firms and the funds were to be managed by highly 
experienced Western specialists. 
 
In the Czech Republic (and before that in Czechoslovakia) privatisation was understood as the 
precondition for the emergence of a market environment. Voucher privatisation was seen as the 
most rapid and the least unfair way of transferring assets from the State sector. It was expected 
that under competitive pressure the initial ownership structure would gradually evolve towards a 
more effective structure.  
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The two different philosophies underlying the two mass privatisation programmes are reflected 
in the design of the regulations of securities markets in the two countries. Poland is usually given 
as an example of a good regulatory strategy while the Czech Republic is blamed for the 
weakness of its regulatory framework (Glaeser, et al., 2001). Indeed, the Polish authorities were 
concerned with the proper development of financial markets in general, and the stock exchange 
in particular, and focused on the creation of a well established legal system and enforceable laws. 
In the NIF programme, the remuneration scheme for NIF managers and the stock exchange 
listing requirements were carefully designed to ensure the transparency of the process and to 
avoid expropriation of minority investors. The main concern was to avoid excessive dispersion 
of ownership and to provide companies with 'effective owners'. But the authors of the 
programme were also concerned with the potential danger of private benefits of control and 
therefore imposed the limit of 33 percent on the lead fund’s holdings in each company.  
 
Such guarantees were deemed unnecessary in the Czech Republic: there was a fear that state 
intervention would create impediments to a rapid development of market institutions. The 
Company law and the laws governing the operation of securities markets were very lax and the 
supervision of securities trading and the associated agents were, until 1998, left to a Securities 
Office in the Ministry of Finance. Privatised companies were listed on the stock exchange 
without having to publish a prospectus and to obtain the approval of the securities regulator. The 
increasing number of financial scandals and opportunistic behaviour involving funds and enterprise 
managers (later called ‘tunnelling’) reflected the weakness of the regulatory framework.
6 The 
pressure from the opposition parties and the press eventually forced the government to establish the 
Securities Commission. 
 
  
The Data 
 
The data for Czech companies is provided by a Czech commercial company, Aspekt 
(www.aspekt.cz) who use official company accounts filed by joint stock companies (for financial 
                                                 
6  For examples of opportunistic behaviour by managers and large shareholders, see Hashi (1998); 
Johnson, et al. (2000) and Glaeser, et al. (2001).  
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information), Prague Securities Centre (for ownership information), and company reports for 
employment and other information. The financial data covers the period of 1993-1999 while the 
ownership data covers the period 1996 to 1999. The data-set was purchased in early 2000 and 
consequently the information for 1999 is not complete for all companies. The ownership data 
includes the identity and the equity holdings of up to seven largest shareholders of each company 
since 1996. There are five types of owners: industrial and commercial companies (corporations), 
investment funds, financial institutions,
7 individuals and the state. The database does not identify 
foreign ownership. 
 
The data set contains financial information on the bulk of mass privatised companies but the 
ownership information is limited to a smaller number of companies because many mass 
privatised companies have left the stock exchange, changed their legal status or have been taken 
over by other companies. After careful cleaning of the data base (involving the deletion of 
observations containing obvious errors) we established a balanced panel of 652 companies for 
which full ownership information is available for the 1996-1999 period.
8 The sample is well 
distributed across 12 sectors of economic activity.
9  
 
The Polish data set, containing all 512 mass privatised companies and covering the 1995-2000 
period, was collected from several sources. The Ministry of State Treasury (Department of 
Privatisation) keeps some basic data on the 512 companies in the National Investment Fund 
Programme, largely for the period before their privatisation. The Department keeps a record of 
major changes in the status of these companies. Additional information was collected from the 
annual reports of NIFs and their portfolio companies through the publication Monitor Polski, 
                                                 
7 The data set contained two sub-groups of financial institutions: portfolio companies (which are engaged 
primarily in buying and selling of shares) and banks. However, as the number of firms in these two sub-
groups was small, they were combined together under ‘financial institutions’ in order to make the 
empirical work more meaningful. 
8 There are occasionally missing observations for individual variables which lowers the number of 
observations to 610 in the regressions presented in Section 5. 
9 Originally firms were grouped into 19 activities based on Prague Stock Exchange classification of 
sectoral activity (which closely resembles NACE classification) but as the number of firms in some 
sectors was very small, for reasons of empirical feasibility, we grouped firms in similar activities and 
formed 12 industrial sectors.  
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NIFs' annual reports and the reports of the Association of National Investment Funds. For 
companies that have been floated on the stock exchange, further information was obtained from 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In the final sample analyzed in this paper we do not include firms 
that went bankrupt or for some reasons were deleted from the registry kept in the Ministry of 
State Treasury. We also exclude observations with missing data. The number of firms in the 
sample was therefore reduced to 439.  
 
Unlike in the Czech Republic, the initial ownership structure of the companies in the mass 
privatisation scheme was uniform and fixed by the scheme (the lead fund had 33 percent of 
shares; other 14 funds 27 percent; employees 15 percent and the state 25 percent). The 
information on ownership change throughout the period 1995-2000, collected from the variety of 
sources described above, allows identifying the largest owners of the companies. It shows the 
extent of the divestiture by NIFs. The distinction is made between foreign and domestic 
shareholders; among the latter there are companies, NIFs, employees, individuals and the state.   
 
 
Changes in the ownership structure 
 
We focus on two dimensions of the change in the ownership structure. First, we look at 
ownership concentration, measured by the share of the largest owner. Second, we consider the 
reallocation of block holdings between different types of owners. The evidence from both Poland 
and the Czech Republic points to an unambiguous increase in concentration of ownership in both 
countries. Table 1 highlights the broad picture of this evolution. 
 
The average holdings of the largest shareholder in the Czech sample increased rapidly from 38.8 
percent in 1996 to 51.9 percent in 1999 and in the Polish sample from 33.9 percent in 1996 to 
50.3 percent in 2000. In the Czech Republic the median figure indicates that by 1999 in half of 
the sample firms the largest owner held almost 50 percent of the firm's equity. The number of 
firms in which the largest shareholder controls more than 50 percent of shares increased indeed 
from 189 in 1996 to 289 in 1999. 
   
  8
The Polish scheme, due to its cautious design, had a degree of inertia built into it. Dominant 
owners, i.e., the ‘lead funds’ holding 33 percent of company shares initially, could not increase 
their share in portfolio companies until they were floated on the stock market or their capital was 
increased. At the same time, companies could not be floated on the stock market until they could 
meet (as any listed company) the stringent listing criteria set by the regulatory agency. Despite 
these restrictions, a significant reallocation of equity holdings, triggered by a combination of the 
NIFs' incentive system and the competitive pressure from the product and factor markets, 
occurred quite rapidly. NIFs have withdrawn from managing a large number of portfolio 
companies. Some firms were floated on the stock exchange, others were sold to strategic 
(domestic or foreign) investors, and some were put into liquidation. NIFs proved to be the agents 
of privatisation rather than agents of restructuring. The net results, as panel (b) of Table 1 shows, 
were that by the year 2000, the largest shareholders were, on average, in absolute control of their 
companies. The differences in the initial ownership structure notwithstanding, the process was 
very similar to that in the Czech Republic.  
 
The second dimension of the change in the ownership structure is the reallocation of ownership 
rights between different types of largest shareholders. This process was different in the two 
samples because of the particularities of the privatization process in the two countries and the 
initially uniform ownership structure of the Polish firm. In Poland, the reallocation of ownership 
was first dominated by the transfer from the state to NIFs and then from NIFs to other types of 
owners. While in 1994 all firms were state-owned, by 2000 the state had reduced its holdings to 
zero in 99 firms and to about 20 percent (on average) in the remaining firms. About 15 percent of 
the companies in the scheme went bankrupt or entered the bankruptcy or liquidation processes. 
36 companies (about 7 percent of the companies in the scheme, 25 of them with strategic 
investors) have satisfied the listing conditions set by the Warsaw Stock Exchange and were 
quoted on the WSE in 2000.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show how equity held by different types of the largest owner has evolved in 
Poland between 1998 and 2000 and in the Czech Republic between 1996 and 1999. 
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In Poland NIFs have withdrawn from 240 firms leaving the companies to the new owner, with 
over 20 percent of them (52 companies) having been sold to foreign investors. Concerning the 
concentration of ownership stakes, it is striking that, on average, most strategic investors have 
gained majority control of the firms' equity. Only NIFs, on average, hold 37 percent of shares of 
their portfolio companies. The employees, who were given special privileges in the Polish mass 
privatization, have acquired control of 13 companies. The highest ownership concentration (75 
percent) can be observed in firms bought by foreign investors. 
 
Similarly, in the Czech Republic we can observe a gradual process of reallocation of large block 
holdings between different types of owners. In the immediate post-privatization period, the state, 
financial institutions and investment funds were the most important large shareholders. A couple 
of years later we can observe the emergence of individual entrepreneurs and industrial and 
commercial companies as the largest shareholders. All categories of largest owners have 
increased their equity stakes. Industrial and commercial companies and financial institutions 
have increased their average holding to over 56 percent while individuals and investment funds 
have increased their average holding to around 45-46 percent.  
 
The unusually rapid changes in ownership structure in firms included in the mass privatisation 
programmes in the Czech Republic and Poland give us the opportunity to empirically investigate 
the determinants of these changes. The owners’ desire to change the initially imposed (Poland) 
or inefficient (the Czech Republic) ownership structure reflected, and certainly responded to, a 
variety of firm specific characteristics and factors representing the environment in which firms 
operate. In what follows we try to identify the determinants of the increase in ownership 
concentration in the group of Czech and Polish firms. 
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3. What makes ownership more or less concentrated? 
 
We look at within country variations in ownership structure which means that we do not consider 
here the important issue on which the work by La Porta, et al. (1998) focused:
10 legal and 
regulatory constraints are held constant. We try to identify the determinants of ownership 
concentration at the level of the firm. We use two dummy variables for ownership concentration: 
1) the increase/decrease of the share of the largest owner since the initial allocation of property 
rights, and 2) the presence/absence of a majority shareholder (holding more than 50 percent of 
shares).  
 
In line with several previous studies investigating the determinants of ownership concentration, 
we expect the following factors to influence our two dependent variables:  
 
 
Performance   
 
Owners’ decision to increase their holding may depend on firm performance. It is possible that in 
less profitable firms shareholders want to increase their holdings in order to better control the 
management and obtain some of the benefits of control. On the other hand, such firms may be 
less attractive for risk-averse shareholders looking for risk diversification. The impact of 
performance on owners’ decision to concentrate their holdings is therefore ambiguous.
11 
 
It is difficult to choose an ideal performance indicator for non-listed firms in transition 
economies. We use profit before taxes and depreciation which is the commonly used measure. 
Alternatively, we use the growth of sales as a measure of performance: it is sometimes argued 
                                                 
10 Looking at cross-country variations, La Porta, et al. (1998) find that concentration of ownership 
(measured by the stake of the three largest shareholders) is negatively correlated with the quality of 
investors' legal protection. In other words, ownership concentration becomes a substitute for legal 
protection of investors.  
11 This ambiguity appears in the previous works. For instance, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find that 
performance has a significant and negative effect on ownership concentration while in Jones, et al. (2003) 
previous profitability does not affect ownership structure in a significant way.   
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that it is less subject to accounting manipulations. Additionally, we include investment which 
may be considered as a proxy for the future prospects of the firm. We expect that higher 
investment activity leads current and potential shareholders to increase their holdings in the firm.  
 
Size 
 
It is usually expected that ownership in larger firms is less likely to be highly concentrated. 
Purchasing large equity shares in a large company is more expensive than doing the same in a 
smaller company. Moreover, the concern for diversification also suggests that owners will be 
careful and refrain from committing a larger fraction of their wealth to one firm. In some 
previous studies (e.g. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) firm size was inversely related to ownership 
concentration. On the other hand, in the highly uncertain conditions of transition economies, 
larger, older and better known firms may be perceived by some shareholders as less likely to go 
bankrupt. In this case, such shareholders would increase their shareholding in larger firms. The 
overall impact of size on ownership structure may thus be ambiguous.  
 
 
Leverage 
 
Also the effect of leverage on ownership concentration may be ambiguous. Highly leveraged 
firms are more risky and risk averse owners may prefer avoiding excessive concentration in such 
firms (Stulz 1988, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Similarly, if leverage is seen as a control 
instrument used to reduce agency costs and creditors substitute owners in their monitoring 
activities, we would expect ownership concentration to be lower in more leveraged firms. But 
debt may also be viewed as complementary monitoring device: in that case higher ownership 
concentration may appear in more indebted companies.  
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Identity of the dominant shareholder  
 
The degree of ownership concentration may strongly depend on who the largest shareholder is. It 
is therefore important to distinguish between different types of block holders. For example, a 
corporation may have stronger motivation than a financial institution to acquire large stakes in a 
firm. The state and the National Investment Funds in Poland are supposed to wither away as 
owners and we expect that their equity will progressively diminish. The nationality of the 
dominant owners may also affect ownership concentration: foreign owners may be more willing 
and capable of acquiring larger stakes in order to control the company. In Poland we can 
distinguish between foreign and domestic investors; and among the latter between corporations, 
individuals, employees, NIFs and the state. In the Czech Republic we can distinguish between 
corporations, individuals, investment funds, financial institutions, and the state. 
 
 
Industry 
 
Ownership concentration may vary across industries. Some industries are more likely to have 
dispersed ownership than others. One of the possible explanations of these differences would be 
that different types of activities require different level of monitoring.
12 In some industries closer 
monitoring may bring about gains to shareholders
13 while in others, especially those regulated by 
the state, additional monitoring by large shareholders may not yield any benefits.
14 Hence, we 
have to control for the type of the industry in order to take this effect into account. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Carlin and Mayer (1999) and Allen (1993). 
13 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) call it 'control potential' and Bebchuk (1999) speaks about private benefits of 
control.  
14 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, e.g., control for regulated industries 
(financial and utilities).  
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4. The model  
 
We analyse the determinants of ownership concentration using two dependent variables. First, 
we estimate the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased since the initial 
allocation of equity stakes (Y1). This was the case in 491 firms in the Czech Republic and in 219 
firms in Poland. Secondly, we estimate the probability that a company has a majority shareholder 
at the end of the considered period (Y2). In our samples, 44 percent of firms in Poland in 2000 
and 49 percent in the Czech Republic in 1999 have a shareholder with more than 50 percent of 
shares. 
 
We use the following general model to identify the factors that affect our dependent variables:  
 
P (Yj=1/ X ) = 
) exp( 1
) exp(
β
β
X
X
+
 
 
Where j=1, 2. 
 
P (Y1 = 1/ X ) is the probability that the share of the largest owner has increased since the 
beginning of the process and P (Y2 = 1/ X ) is the probability that the largest owner holds more 
than 50 percent of shares, both conditioned on the realization of  X , which represents the vector 
of explanatory variables and β  is the corresponding vector of coefficients.  
 
The vector of explanatory variables  X  includes the following variables: performance, size, 
leverage, investment, type of the largest owner, industry, and a set of variables representing 
specific features of mass privatisation in the two countries.  
 
Performance is defined as ratio of earnings before taxes and depreciation to total assets (the 
growth of sales is used as another proxy for performance); size is measured by natural logarithm 
of sales in constant prices; leverage is defined as total liabilities over total assets; investment is 
the ratio of net investment in fixed assets to total assets. In order to alleviate the problem of 
potential endogeneity of ownership concentration, the four variables (performance, size, leverage  
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and investment) are averaged over the period ending one year earlier than the year for which 
ownership is considered. (i.e., 1996-1998 for the Czech sample and 1995-1999 for the Polish 
sample). Type of owner is a set of dummies representing different types of the largest 
shareholder. Industry represents a set of dummies for industries to which the firm belongs (12 for 
Czech firms and 20 in Poland).  
 
In the case of the Czech Republic we want to distinguish between firms that were privatised in 
the first and in the second wave of the voucher scheme. We also include the initial level of 
ownership concentration (in 1996).
15 We obviously expect that the increase in ownership 
concentration will be less likely in firms that were initially already highly concentrated. Such 
firms are also more likely to have at the end of the process a majority investor. In Poland, the 
initial level of ownership concentration was by design the same for all firms so we do not include 
this variable in the regressions. In the case of Polish mass privatised firms we distinguish 
between listed and non-listed firms by using a dummy variable for firms that are listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). It may be expected that firms listed on the stock exchange are 
more likely to have widely held share ownership structure. We also want to distinguish between 
various National Investment Funds and we include a set of dummies representing the lead 
National Investment Fund of each company (15 NIFs altogether). We know that these funds 
differed in their strategies towards firms in their portfolios: some funds behaved more like 
venture capital funds while others chose strategies of purely financial intermediaries. Firms' 
ownership concentration might have been influenced by these strategies. The full list of variables 
is presented in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Ownership concentration is measured by the share of the largest shareholder. In the regression analysis, 
we use a logistic transformation of this measure. See table 4 for the exact definition.   
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5. The results  
 
Tables 5 and 6 show respectively the results for Poland and for the Czech Republic. For each of 
the two dependent variables we present two sets of regressions: with and without dummies 
representing the type of the largest shareholder. For Poland additionally, before adding all types 
of domestic owners, we show, in columns 2 and 5 the results of the regression in which only 
foreign versus domestic owner is considered.  
 
The inclusion of the type of the largest owner significantly improves the explanatory power of 
the regressions, particularly in Poland. In both countries most of the coefficients of the dummies 
representing the type of the largest owner are significant.
16  In particular, in Poland the firm is 
significantly more likely to be majority controlled if it has a foreign largest shareholder. The 
presence of a foreign dominant shareholder also significantly influences the probability of an 
increase in its equity holdings. Interpreting the coefficients of various dummies representing the 
types of owners we should remember that the reference group is the state in the Czech Republic 
and the state together with NIFs in Poland .These types of owners are supposed to wither away 
and therefore it is not surprising that other categories are more likely to increase their equity 
holdings and to take majority control.  
 
We do not observe a significant relationship between ownership concentration and either 
leverage or investment. But some of the privatisation-related variables turn out to be quite 
important. Firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange are less likely to experience increasing 
concentration and are less likely to have a majority owner. It could be argued that ownership 
dispersion is safer in listed firms as investors have access to a much greater amount of 
information and also a certain amount of monitoring is undertaken by the financial market itself. 
So the opportunities for reaping the benefits of control by increasing ownership concentration 
and monitoring are more limited. Moreover, according to the regulation of the WSE, beyond a 
certain level of ownership concentration, the dominant shareholders have to make compulsory 
                                                 
16 Only in the Czech Republic the presence/absence of a majority shareholder is not affected by the largest 
shareholder being an individual or an investment fund. These two categories of owners were the main  
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purchase offers to other shareholders, which may require a prohibitively large amount of 
resources. In the Czech Republic, as expected, the higher the initial level of ownership 
concentration, the lower the probability that the share of the largest shareholder has increased 
and the higher the probability that the firm has found a majority owner.  
 
The evidence about the importance of firm size is mixed: it becomes insignificant in Poland 
when all types of largest owners are included and only slightly positive in the Czech Republic. 
This result suggests that the desire of diversification and the search for a safe investment (which 
large firms may offer in an uncertain environment) counteract each other. More importantly, we 
get a contrasting result comparing the correlation between firms' past performance and 
ownership concentration in the two countries. In Poland firm's past performance does not seem 
to affect the probability of the increase in the share of the largest owner (it is even slightly 
negative if we do not control for the type of the largest owner). Also, the presence of a majority 
shareholder is more likely in firms characterized by poor past profitability. In contrast, in the 
Czech Republic the coefficient of past profitability is positive and affects very strongly the 
probability that the share of the largest owner has increased. This result may reflect the owners' 
willingness to avoid increasing their equity holdings in the Czech poorly performing firms. In 
Poland, investors appear more likely trying to reap some benefits of control.
17    
 
The results are robust to the use of an alternative measure of firm performance:  the growth of 
sales, and an alternative measure of firm size:  the natural logarithm of the value of assets.
18 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In firms privatized in the framework of mass privatization programmes in Poland and the Czech 
Republic we observe a significant increase in ownership concentration measured by the share of 
                                                                                                                                                             
players in the auctions of the voucher scheme and their behaviour might not differ significantly from the 
state, which is here the base group.  
17 Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) show that the performance of Polish listed firms improves when the largest 
owner has a majority stake in the company. 
18 The results are available on request.  
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the largest owner. This evidence goes against the main argument of the critics of mass 
privatization programmes who were convinced that these programmes would bring about 
dispersed ownership structure at firm level. The fact that the evolution of ownership 
concentration is similar in Poland and in the Czech Republic suggests that private benefits of 
control are large in both countries (see Bebchuk, 1999). If we refer to 'law matters' theory, this 
suggests that the quality of investor protection regime is rather low in both countries. So we do 
not get a confirmation of the usual view that the Polish legal and regulatory framework is much 
better than the one in the Czech Republic. However, although the direct comparison of 
ownership concentration in the two countries does not provide a confirmation of the main 
prediction of 'law matters' theory, we find indirect evidence in its favour.  
 
Looking at the relationship between the change in ownership concentration and firm 
performance, we find an interesting result: in the Czech Republic the increase in ownership 
concentration seems to be less likely in poorly performing firms while in Poland the quality of 
past performance does not affect investors' willingness to increase their holdings. This 
contrasting effect may be interpreted in the light of the theory stressing the importance of the 
quality of investors' protection. It could be argued indeed that if Czech investors seem to be more 
risk averse and more concerned with diversification this is largely due to the weakness of the 
legal protection they face.   
  18
APPENDIX  
 
 
Mass Privatisation in the Czech Republic 
 
 
The main method of privatisation in the Czech Republic was ‘voucher privatisation’ through 
which some 1700 companies were privatised in two ‘waves’ in 1991–92 and 1992–94. 
19 The 
shares of these companies were transferred to either individuals or privatisation investment funds 
(PIFs) in exchange for vouchers. PIFs set up by manufacturing companies, private individuals 
and institutions as well as state-owned banks and insurance companies, actively participated in 
the process as financial intermediaries. Adult citizens received vouchers which they could 
exchange for the shares of companies in the scheme either directly or indirectly through 
privatisation investment funds. In the latter case, they could entrust their vouchers to investment 
funds and become shareholders of these funds (which were joint stock companies) or unit 
holders in unit trusts. The funds, in turn, could use vouchers collected from their members to bid 
for shares of their preferred companies. Understandably, given the prevailing information 
asymmetry and risk aversion, the majority of citizens opted for the second alternative and 
entrusted their vouchers to investment funds. In the first wave, 72 percent of investment points 
available were used by funds and 28 percent by individuals directly. In the second wave, the 
percentages were 64 percent and 36 percent respectively. The bulk of investment points 
controlled by funds were concentrated in the hands of a small number of funds set up by banks 
and financial institutions (Hashi 1998). In the first wave, these funds were all close-end funds but 
in the second wave many of them took the form of unit trusts. Later on, as part of the reform of 
the financial system, close-end funds were required to convert themselves to open funds by 2002. 
Initially, the funds were allowed to hold up to 20 percent of the shares of each company in the 
scheme, though they quickly found ways of bypassing this constraint. The funds’ maximum 
holding in each company was later reduced to 11 percent. 
 
                                                 
19 For details of the Czech privatization see Mejstrik (1997).  
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The shares of mass privatised companies and privatisation investment funds were immediately 
listed on the stock market without the requirement of prior approval and the publication of a 
prospectus. The process of buying and selling of shares, and the reorganisation of funds’ 
portfolios, quickly followed the two waves – a process generally referred to as the ‘third wave’ 
of privatisation. Investment funds, despite their large overall stakes, were generally not in a 
controlling position in their portfolio companies. Many funds had ended up with shares of too 
many companies and wanted to reduce the size of their portfolios. Many individual shareholders, 
preferring cash to risky shares, also entered the secondary market, selling their shares, thus 
further pushing down share prices.
20 A major feature of the so-called third wave of privatisation 
was the take-over of investment funds. Given that PIFs (especially those set up in the first wave) 
were joint stock companies with a large number of shareholders, they were easy targets for 
aggressive bidders. 
                                                 
20  It was estimated that in the early post-privatization period up to one-third of individuals who had 
obtained shares in the voucher scheme sold their shares. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Report, 2nd Quarter 1995, p. 15.   
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Mass Privatisation in Poland  
 
 
The scale of the Polish mass privatisation was less spectacular than the Czech scheme. It 
included 512 companies and 15 National Investment Funds (NIF), which were set up by the 
Government.
21 The management of these funds was initially entrusted to special consortia of 
Western and Polish partners (commercial banks, investment banks, consulting firms) selected 
through an international tender offer. The implementation of the programme was delayed by at 
least four years (1991-95) for political reasons, mainly the absence of a consensus in the 
government and the parliament about the final list of companies in the scheme, the precise share 
of different beneficiaries and the specific arrangements concerning corporate governance of the 
NIFs. The equity of 512 companies was transferred from the state to new owners according to a 
common scheme: the majority of shares of each company (60 percent) were given to the 15 
National Investment Funds, with the remaining 40 percent going to employees (15 percent) and 
the Treasury (25 percent). For each company, one of the 15 NIFs received 33 percent of shares 
and thus became the ‘lead fund’ for that company. The remaining 27 percent were divided 
between the other 14 funds (each holding just under 2 percent of shares). This uniform scheme 
sharply contrasted with the Czech programme where the outcome of the bidding process was 
completely unforeseeable and any number of funds, individuals and other beneficiaries could end 
up as new owners of the companies. 
 
Foreign financial institutions were invited to participate in the programme and, together with 
Polish institutions, bid for the management of NIFs under lucrative remuneration arrangements. 
The aim was to bring in the fund management know-how and expertise and ensure that Polish 
institutions learn from their foreign partners. At the same time, foreign institutions with 
international reputation were expected to follow the same practice as in their own countries, and 
not to engage in opportunistic behavior, insider dealing and shareholder expropriation which 
their inexperienced Polish counterparts may have been tempted to embark on. Many foreign 
institutions did take part in the programme and most NIFs started to be managed by consortia of 
foreign and Polish institutions.   
  21
 
The citizens did not become direct shareholders of companies in the scheme but received 
vouchers (or certificates) which entitled them to one share in each of the 15 Funds, thus 
becoming indirect shareholders of privatised companies. The stated aim of the programme was 
for NIFs to restructure their portfolio companies, turn them into market oriented firms and sell 
them to either strategic owners or on the stock exchange. The Funds themselves were floated on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange in June 1997 and the citizens’ certificates had to be converted to 
Funds’ shares by the end of 1998. Following a buoyant initial market, and the large-scale sale 
and purchase of shares, the role of the government began to decline and private owners began to 
dominate the NIFs. After the first general meetings of shareholders, members of the supervisory 
boards initially appointed by the government were replaced by members elected by new private 
shareholders. The direct role of the state in the funds came to an end. 
                                                                                                                                                             
21  For details of the Polish mass privatisation, see Hashi (2000) and Mickiewicz and Baltowski (2003).  
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Table 1: Average shareholdings of the largest owner in mass privatised firms  
 
 
(a) Czech Republic 
 
  
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
Mean 
 
38.8 
 
42.8 
 
48.6 
 
51.9 
 
Median  36.3 42.0 47.5 49.7 
 
Std.  Dev.  19.3 20.4 21.5 21.8 
 
Number  of  firms  652 652 652 652 
 
      
 
(b) Poland 
 
  
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
Mean 
 
33.9 
 
36.7 
 
42.1 
 
47.7 
 
50.3 
 
Median  33 33 33 33 33 
 
Std. Dev.  5.5  10.1  15.8  20.6  22.6 
 
Number  of  firms  441 440 439 439 439 
 
Source: Own calculation   
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Table 2: Poland: The largest shareholder in mass privatized firms, 1998-2000 
 
 
For each type of the largest shareholder the first row shows the number of firms, the second the average 
equity holdings and the third its standard deviation 
 
  
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
 
 
Foreign investor  
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
 
Domestic investors 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
Of which: 
employees 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
     
individual 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
      
corporation 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
      
National Investment Fund 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
     
 State 
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
Total 
 
 
33 
61.27 
27.40 
 
 
406 
49.46 
21.95 
 
 
9 
43.29 
16.01 
 
15 
63.01 
17.61 
 
75 
58.09 
22.63 
 
298 
46.56 
21.28 
 
9 
57.00 
24.26 
 
439 
 
44 
64.87 
26.61 
 
 
395 
48.73 
21.53 
 
 
13 
65.81 
22.16 
 
29 
54.20 
23.80 
 
100 
56.07 
22.85 
 
243 
44.65 
19.29 
 
10 
36.29 
19.74 
 
439 
 
52 
75.11 
 22.14 
 
 
387 
47.02  
20.5 
 
 
13 
55.3 
 17.36 
 
39 
57.52  
21.89 
 
124 
61.25 
 20.30 
 
199 
37.25 
 12.38 
 
12 
18.7  
7.54 
 
439 
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Table 3: Czech Republic: the largest shareholder in mass privatised firms,  
1996-1999 
 
For each type of the largest shareholder the first row shows the number of firms, the second the average 
equity holdings and the third its standard deviation 
 
 
 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
 
Individual
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
89 
35.12 
15.18 
 
92 
36.40 
16.70 
 
104 
39.39 
18.56 
 
108 
44.77 
22.74 
 
Industrial or commercial company
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
295 
46.60 
19.15 
 
371 
47.95 
20.48 
 
372 
53.90 
21.05 
 
404 
55.62 
20.93 
 
Investment fund
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
148 
27.97 
15.41 
 
127 
32.73 
18.25 
 
116 
42.03 
20.92 
 
96 
46.27 
21.16 
 
Financial institution
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
58 
38.03 
18.51 
 
33 
42.44 
17.16 
 
41 
47.70 
20.16 
 
27 
51.27 
22.61 
 
State
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
62 
33.05 
18.26 
 
29 
40.64 
20.47 
 
19 
37.07 
20.32 
 
17 
42.99 
20.43 
 
Total
Average equity in   percent 
Standard Deviation 
 
652 
38.75 
19.26 
 
652 
42.75 
20.38 
 
652 
48.59 
21.49 
 
652 
51.94 
21.82 
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Table 4: Definition of variables  
 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
 
Return on assets 
 
Ratio of earnings before taxes and depreciation to total assets.  
 
Size  Natural logarithm of sales (in constant prices)  
 
 
Leverage 
 
Ratio of total liabilities to total assets  
 
Investment 
 
 
Ratio of net investment in fixed assets to total assets  
Type of the largest 
owner 
Dummies for different types of the largest shareholder in 1999 in 
the Czech Republic and in 2000 in Poland. In Poland we have 
foreign versus domestic investors, among which we distinguish 
between corporations, individuals, employees, the state and 
National Investment Funds. In the Czech Republic, there are five 
types of the largest owners: corporations, individuals, investment 
funds, financial institutions, and the state. 
 
First wave of voucher 
privatisation in the 
Czech Republic 
 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for companies included in 
the first wave of voucher privatisation, and 0 otherwise 
 
Share of the largest 
owner in 1996 
 
Logistic transformation of the percentage share of the largest 
shareholder (C1) of a company:  ln [C1/(100-C1)] 
 
 
National Investment 
Fund dummies 
 
Dummies for each of the 15 lead NIFs  
 
Industry dummies 
 
Dummies for industries to which firms belong. There are 12 
industries in the Czech Republic and 20 in Poland 
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Table 5: Determinants of ownership concentration in Poland (probit regressions) 
 
In columns (1), (2) and (3) the dependent variable is equal to one if in 2000 the firm has an owner with at 
least 50% of shares and zero otherwise. In columns (4), (5) and (6) the dependent variable is equal to one 
if the share of the largest owner has increased between 1995 and 2000 and zero otherwise. All 
independent variables, except dummies, are averaged over 1995-1999. The type of the largest owner 
refers to 2000. Standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at 
the 5 percent level; and *** significant at the 1 percent level. All regressions include a constant term; the 
reference group for the ‘type of the largest owner’ is the combined category of State and National 
Investment Fund. 
See Table 4 for detailed definitions of variables. 
 
   
Increase in the share of the largest 
owner 1995 - 2000 
 
Presence of a majority shareholder 
in 2000 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Return on assets 
 
 
 
-0.731* 
(0.428) 
 
-0.685 
(0.436) 
 
-0.369 
(0.427) 
 
-1.078** 
(0.481) 
 
-1.048** 
(0.495) 
 
-0.685 
(0.467) 
Size 
 
 
-0.056 
(0.081) 
-0.160 
(0.088) 
0.119 
(0.102) 
-0.162** 
(0.083) 
-0.295*** 
(0.092) 
-0.166 
(0.109) 
Leverage 
 
 
-0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.014 
(0.047) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
Investment 
 
 
0.054 
(0.188) 
0.084 
(0.196) 
0.021 
(0.229) 
0.088 
(0.190) 
0.123 
(0.198) 
0.063 
(0.234) 
Firms listed on the WSE 
 
-0.487* 
(0.263) 
-0.610** 
(0.280) 
-0.730** 
(0.306) 
-0.599** 
(0.281) 
-0.798** 
(0.314) 
-0.970*** 
(0.367) 
Type of the largest owner 
  
      
     Foreign investor    1.722*** 
(0.285) 
2.353*** 
(0.290) 
 1.834*** 
(0.279) 
2.681*** 
(0.300) 
     Domestic investor ,  
        of which: 
      
        Corporation 
 
   1.850*** 
(0.200) 
   1.994*** 
(0.210) 
        Individual 
 
   1.455*** 
(0.281) 
   1.772*** 
(0.294) 
        Employees 
 
   1.351*** 
(0.437) 
   1.590*** 
(0.445) 
NIF dummies 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Industry dummies  
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Number of observations 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
434 
 
Pseudo R
2 
 
 
0.160 
 
0.237 
 
0.415 
 
0.183 
 
0.274 
 
0.475  
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Table 6: Determinants of ownership concentration in the Czech Republic (probit 
regressions) 
 
In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is equal to one if in 1999 the firm has an owner with at least 
50% of shares and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is equal to one if the 
share of the largest owner has increased between 1996 and 1999. All independent variables, except 
dummies, are averaged over 1995-1999. The type of largest owner refers to 1999. Standard errors are in 
parentheses; * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; and *** significant 
at the 1 percent level. All regressions include a constant term; the reference group for the ‘type of the 
largest owner’ is ‘State’. 
See Table 4 for detailed definitions of variables. 
 
 
  Increase in the share of  the 
 largest owner 1996 – 1999 
        
(1)                 (2)           
Presence of a majority owner 
in 1999 
 
      (3)                        (4) 
 
Return on assets 
 
 
 
1.875*** 
(0.652) 
 
1.819*** 
(0.663) 
 
0.870 
(0.584) 
 
0.754 
(0.597) 
Size 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.038) 
0.013 
(0.040) 
0.067 
(0.037) 
0.073* 
(0.039) 
Share of the largest owner in 1996 
 
 
-0.383*** 
(0.063) 
-0.394*** 
(0.065) 
0.649*** 
(0.068) 
0.647*** 
(0.070) 
Leverage 
 
 
-0.089 
(0.250) 
-0.065 
(0.253) 
0.000 
(0.240) 
-0.035 
(0.241) 
Investment 
 
 
0.493 
(0.383) 
0.502 
(0.387) 
-0.045 
(0.346) 
-0.055 
(0.344) 
Firms privatised in the first wave of 
voucher privatisation 
0.104 
(0.179) 
0.079 
(0.181) 
-0.234 
(0.176) 
-0.256 
(0.180) 
 
Type of the largest owner  
    
        Corporation 
 
 1.034*** 
(0367) 
 0.921** 
(0.381) 
        Individual 
 
 0.826** 
(0.395) 
 0.526 
(0.408) 
        Investment fund 
 
 1.033*** 
(0.390) 
 0.652 
(0.402) 
        Financial institution 
 
 1.207** 
(0.488) 
 0.981** 
(0.464) 
 
Industry  dummies    yes yes yes yes 
 
Number of observations  610  610 610 610 
 
Pseudo R
2 
 
0.092 
 
0.107 
 
0.158 
 
0.174 
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